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The Mahabharata, an Indian epic poem, describes a legendary war between 
two sides of a royal family. The epic’s plot involves numerous moral 
dilemmas that have intrigued and perplexed scholars of Indian literature. 
Many of these dilemmas revolve around a character named Krsna. Krsna 
is a divine incarnation and a self-proclaimed upholder of dharma, a system 
of social and religious duties central to Hindu ethics. Yet, during the war, 
Krsna repeatedly encourages his allies to use tactics that violate dharma. In 
this paper, I try to make sense of Krsna’s actions by analyzing them in terms 
of categories from Western moral philosophy. I show that Krsna seems to 
embrace an ethical approach called consequentialism, but that his version 
of consequentialism differs from Western theories of consequentialism by 
seeing adherence to dharma as an intrinsic good. 
Note: In citing passages from the Bhagavad-Gita in this paper, I cite Zaehner’s 1969 
translation. In citing passages from the rest of the Mahabharata, I cite two volumes 
(1973, 1975) of Buitenen’s translation, except where otherwise indicated. Where available 
volumes of Buitenen’s translation do not include sections of the Mahabharata that I want 
to cite, I use Ganguli’s 1883-1896 translation.
1. Introduction
This paper’s purpose is to situate moral issues in the Mahabharata, an Indian epic poem, in 
relation to some categories from Western moral philosophy. Some scholars have already 
tried to do this. For example, Agarwal (1992, pp. 129-142) sees in the Mahabharata a 
conflict between utilitarianism and a more Kantian approach to ethics. In the Bhagavad-
33
Praxis, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2011      ISSN 1756-1019
Gita, a famous section of the Mahabharata, two characters named Arjuna and Krsna 
discuss the morality of an impending war. According to Agarwal, Arjuna argues as a 
utilitarian, voicing concern about the consequences of fighting, whereas Krsna tells 
Arjuna to fight because it is his duty. However, this cannot be the whole story regarding 
Krsna’s moral viewpoint. During the war, Krsna repeatedly urges the Pandavas to violate 
dharma, or duty, in order to win. In these cases, he does not seem to think that dharma 
overrides concern about consequences. At the same time, the Mahabharata affirms that 
adherence to dharma is the most valuable of human goals, and that Krsna’s purpose on 
earth is to restore adherence to dharma. In this paper, I argue that Krsna advocates a form 
of consequentialism—but one according to which adherence to dharma is good in itself.   
The Mahabharata revolves around the legendary Bharata war, a war between two sides 
of a royal family. These two sides are commonly called the Pandavas and the Kauravas.1 
The Pandavas and the Kauravas are the sons of the princes Pandu and Dhrtarastra, 
respectively. Dhrtarastra is blind, and his blindness makes him ineligible for the throne. 
After Pandu becomes king, he accidentally wounds a sage. The sage curses Pandu to die 
if he engages in sexual activity. Pandu goes into exile with his wives Kunti and Madri, 
and Dhrtarastra rules despite his blindness. Kunti and Madri bear sons through divine 
intervention. The gods Indra, Vayu, and Dharma father Kunti’s sons, Arjuna, Bhima, 
and Yudhisthira respectively. The Asvins, divine twins, father Madri’s sons, Nakula and 
Sahadeva. Meanwhile, Dhrtarastra fathers the Kauravas, the eldest of whom is named 
Duryodhana. The Kauravas are incarnate demons.
Duryodhana wants the throne for himself. However, when the Pandavas return from 
exile, Dhrtarastra makes Yudhisthira the crown prince. As one might imagine, this creates 
tension between the Pandavas and the Kauravas. After a failed assassination attempt, a 
failed partition of the kingdom, and a rather extreme gambling match that results in exile 
for the Pandavas, the two sides of the family prepare for war. Friends and relatives must 
take sides in the conflict. Thus, the Pandavas find themselves facing loved ones on the 
battlefield. The Pandavas “win” the war, but at a horrible cost. Only the Pandavas and a few 
others survive. Moreover, the Pandavas find themselves resorting to dishonorable tactics 
in order to win.
1  Technically, both sides of the family are Kauravas (“descendants of Kuru”), for they share an ancestor 
named Kuru. However, tradition has often reserved the label “Kaurava” for the Pandavas’ cousins, and that 
is how I will use the term in this paper.
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To make matters more disturbing, those tactics are often suggested by Krsna, Arjuna’s 
charioteer, who is an incarnation of the supreme god Visnu and a self-proclaimed 
upholder of dharma. For example, consider Krsna’s treatment of Bhisma, a warrior for the 
Kauravas. Bhisma knows that Sikhandi, a warrior for the Pandavas, was a woman in his 
previous life. Krsna tells the Pandavas to set Sikhandi on Bhisma. Bhisma refuses to fight 
Sikhandi, who deals Bhisma a mortal wound. Another example concerns Karna, another 
warrior for the Kauravas. When Arjuna fights Karna, Karna’s chariot wheel gets stuck. 
Karna asks Arjuna to let him get his chariot unstuck before continuing with the battle. 
But Krsna reminds Arjuna of Karna’s misdeeds and tells him to kill Karna immediately. 
During a mace fight between Bhima and Duryodhana, Krsna tells Bhima to violate the 
warrior code by using a low blow. 
In light of his divine status, Krsna’s apparent disregard for dharma presents a puzzle. 
Remarking on Krsna’s adharmic behavior, Sukthankar calls him “that paradox of 
paradoxes” (1957, p. 12). The actions of this “devious divinity”, as Matilal (1991, pp. 401-
418) calls Krsna, create numerous ethical—not to mention theological—issues. In this 
paper, I try to make sense of Krsna’s moral viewpoint.2
2. Intrinsic and extrinsic goods
Before continuing, I must introduce some terminology. First I will distinguish between 
various kinds of goods. By “goods”, I mean things that are good. Goods are either intrinsic 
or extrinsic. When I say that X is an intrinsic good or is intrinsically good, I mean that 
X is good in itself. When I say that X is an extrinsic good or is extrinsically good, I mean 
that X is good because of its relations to other things. The most obvious examples of 
extrinsic goods are instrumental goods. When I say that X is an instrumental good or 
is instrumentally good, I mean that X is a means to other goods.3 For instance, consider 
money. Money allows one to buy other goods. Thus, money is instrumentally good.
2  In writing a two-paragraph summary of a sprawling epic, I have not bothered to support every statement 
with burdensome and unnecessary citations. However, a published summary of the Mahabharata, which 
includes most of the details that I mentioned, can be found in Buitenen (1973, pp. xiii-xv).
3  As Anderson (1993, p. 19-20) points out, not all extrinsic goods are instrumental goods. (Anderson uses 
the term “intrinsic value” where I use the term “intrinsic goodness”, but her point is the same.) Anderson 
uses the following example to illustrate this point. Suppose that a friend gives me an ugly bracelet as a gift. 
For me, the bracelet is only an extrinsic good: I value it only because of its relation my friend. Yet the bracelet 
is surely not a means to achieving other good things. Thus, the bracelet is not an instrumental good.
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Note that a thing can be both an intrinsic good and an extrinsic good. Consider happiness. 
A person regards his happiness as good in itself. Thus, he regards his happiness as an 
intrinsic good. At the same time, if a person is happy, then he is more likely to benefit 
others. Thus, a person may also regard his happiness as a means to the good of others. That 
is, he may also regard his happiness as an instrumental good. 
3. Consequentialism, deontology, and dharma
I will now discuss two ethical terms that appear frequently throughout this paper—
consequentialism and deontology.
Consequentialism is one approach to ethics. For consequentialists, the sole aim of 
morality is to produce good consequences. More specifically, consequentialists think that 
the sole aim of morality is to maximize intrinsic goods.4 Consequentialists disagree about 
what counts as an intrinsic good. According to one kind of consequentialism, hedonistic 
utilitarianism, pleasure is the only intrinsic good. Other consequentialists believe that 
pleasure is not the only intrinsic good. In fact, some consequentialists regard certain 
consequences as good apart from their impact on people’s welfare.5 Besides disagreeing 
about what counts as an intrinsic good, consequentialists disagree about the use of rules. 
According to act-consequentialism, the right action is whatever action maximizes intrinsic 
goods. According to rule-consequentialism, right actions are actions that obey certain rules, 
where the rules have been chosen based on their tendency to maximize intrinsic goods. 
However, despite their disagreements, consequentialists agree that the point of morality is 
to maximize intrinsic goods.
4  According to the usual definition, consequentialism seeks to maximize goods or good consequences. 
However, given our division of goods into intrinsic and extrinsic goods, and our further division of extrinsic 
goods into instrumental and non-instrumental extrinsic goods, we must specify what kind of goods con-
sequentialism ultimately seeks to maximize. Purely instrumental goods are good only as a means to other 
goods. Thus, no one, consequentialist or otherwise, is interested in maximizing purely instrumental goods 
for their own sake. It is less obvious to me that no one would seek to maximize non-instrumental extrinsic 
goods for their own sake. Nonetheless, consequentialism is generally understood as a moral system whose 
goal is to maximize intrinsic goods (cf. Anderson, 1993, pp. 30-31: Anderson uses the term “intrinsic value” 
instead of “intrinsic goodness”, but her point is the same), and I define consequentialism accordingly in this 
paper. If consequentialism’s goal were expanded to include the maximization of non-instrumental extrinsic 
goods, my main line of argument in this paper would not be much affected.
5  For example, Hurka (1993) advocates a form of “maximizing consequentialism” (p. 55) whose account of 




In contrast, according to deontological ethics, morality is a matter of adhering to duties. 
For a deontologist, if an action violates a duty, then the action is wrong—even if the 
action produces intrinsic goods. A deontologist need not believe that duties require no 
justification. In fact, some deontologists provide sophisticated justifications for duties. For 
example, Immanuel Kant attempts to derive duties from the very presuppositions that 
agents make when choosing their actions.6 Moreover, some deontologists think that, in 
extreme situations, the need to avoid bad consequences can override duties (Alexander 
and Moore, 2007). However, to qualify as a deontologist, one must hold that an agent has 
moral duties that are not justified in terms of their consequences.
What does all this have to do with the Mahabharata? In the Mahabharata, the concept 
of dharma figures prominently. Dharma is a “metaphysically based system of laws, 
duties, rites and obligations incumbent upon a Hindu according to his class and stage 
of life” (Dimmitt and Buitenen, 1978, p. 353). The words “order”, “justice”, “morality”, 
“righteousness”, “virtue”, “custom”, and “ritual” each indicate a part of its meaning (Buitenen 
1973, p. xli). Buitenen (1973, p. xli) translates dharma as “Law” in his translation of the 
Mahabharata. Dharma’s negative counterpart is adharma, “non-dharma”, which can be 
roughly defined as violation of dharma. (In this paper, I will use the term “dharmic” as an 
adjective for actions that adhere to dharma and the term “adharmic” as an adjective for 
actions that violate dharma.) We will explore the nature of dharma in more detail later in 
this paper. For now, the following observation suffices. Dharma refers at least partly to a 
person’s “norms of conduct” (Killingley 2003, p. 40), to his duties. Thus, if Krsna advocates 
adherence to dharma irrespective of consequences, then we have reason to classify him as 
a deontologist. If he advocates dharmic behavior only when, or only because, it produces 
6  A full discussion of Kant’s ethical theory would be out of place here. However, I will provide a brief over-
view of Kant’s attempt to establish moral duties. According to Kant, I presuppose that I am free whenever 
I make a choice. Thus, my practical reason—the reason that I use when making choices—must presuppose 
that my will is free, i.e. not governed by forces outside of it (Kant, 1785, p. 60). If my will is not governed 
by forces outside of it, then my will must be “autonomous”: it must be governed by laws that it imposes on 
itself (Kant, 1785, p. 44). But if my will is governed by laws that it imposes on itself, then my choices must all 
adhere to principles that my will can accept as laws. Or, as Kant puts it, my choices must obey the command 
“Always choose in such a way that in the same volition the maxims of the choice are at the same time present 
as universal law” (Kant, 1785, p. 44). Kant seeks to derive all duties from this “categorical imperative”.  (To be 
precise, this is one formulation of the categorical imperative. Kant gives various formulations of the impera-
tive, e.g. “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, 
always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” [Kant, 1785, p. 36]. He claims that these 
formulations are equivalent to each other.)
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good consequences, then we have reason to classify him as a consequentialist.7
4. Krsna and adharmic behavior
In the Bhagavad-Gita, Arjuna faces a dilemma. It is the beginning of the Bharata war. 
Looking across the battlefield, Arjuna sees his old friends and relatives in the opposing 
ranks. As he reflects on the oncoming war, he fears that it will produce bad consequences—
death, destruction, social collapse, and finally hell for all those involved (Zaehner, 1969, p. 
47). However, Arjuna is a warrior, so his dharma includes the duty to fight (Zaehner 1969, 
p. 50). At face value, this looks like a choice between consequentialism and deontology: 
on one hand, Arjuna can try to minimize bad consequences by not fighting; on the other 
hand, he can adhere to his duty and fight, regardless of the consequences. In response 
to Arjuna’s dilemma, Krsna urges Arjuna to fight (Zaehner, 1969, pp. 50, 137) without 
anxiety about the consequences (Zaehner, 1969, p. 51). Thus, as a first guess, we might 
say that Krsna rejects consequentialism and accepts “a sort of Kantian ethics of duty” 
(Agrawal, 1992, p. 137), a deontological ethics.   
However, this first guess does not work. Throughout the war, the Pandavas repeatedly 
pursue victory through adharmic means (Sukthankar, 1957, p. 12). In many cases, Krsna 
is responsible for the Pandavas’ decisions to violate dharma (Matilal, 1991, p. 405). 
Moreover, at the end of the war, voices from heaven confirm that the Pandavas have killed 
Bhisma, Karna, and others by adharmic means (Goldman, 1997, p. 210). Unfazed by the 
heavenly voices, Krsna defends the Pandavas’ adharmic actions in the following words:
Ye could never have slain them in battle by fighting fairly! King Duryodhana also could 
never be slain in a fair encounter! The same is the case with all those mighty car-warriors 
headed by [Bhisma]! From desire of doing good to you, I repeatedly applied my powers 
of illusion and caused them to be slain by diverse means in battle. If I had not adopted 
such deceitful ways in battle, victory would never have been yours […] You should 
not take it to heart that this foe of yours hath been slain deceitfully. When the number 
of one’s foes becomes great, then destruction should be effected by contrivances and 
means. The gods themselves, in slaying the [demons], have trod the same way. That way, 
therefore, that hath been trod by the gods, may be trod by all. (Ganguli, 1883-1896b)
7  As an aside, I should note here that, in addition to consequentialism and deontology, there is another ma-
jor approach to ethics in contemporary philosophy—virtue ethics. The term “virtue ethics” covers a variety 
of different ethical theories that focus on the cultivation of positive character traits or virtues (Hursthouse, 
2007). I ignore virtue ethics in this paper. The Mahabharata has a great deal to say on the subject of charac-
ter and virtue. However, virtue ethics is not centrally relevant to my argument in this paper. In this paper, 
I argue that Krsna is a kind of consequentialist. As far as I can tell, the main objections to my thesis would 
rely on passages that suggest that Krsna is a deontologist. 
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Thus, Krsna clearly believes that adharmic actions can be justified by their good 
consequences. Therefore, he does not appear to be a deontologist. On the contrary, his 
defense of the Pandavas’ adharmic behavior seems clearly consequentialist.    
At the same time, Krsna’s primary goal is apparently to restore dharmic behavior. In the 
Gita, Krsna says that he comes to earth “whenever the law of righteousness [i.e. dharma] 
withers away and lawlessness [i.e. adharma] arises” (Zaehner, 1969, p. 58). Visnu says the 
same thing in another part of the epic: “Whenever, sage, the Law languishes and Unlaw 
rears up, I create myself ” (Buitenen, 1975, p. 592). (Recall that Krsna is an incarnation 
of Visnu.) If Krsna’s mission is to restore dharmic behavior, then why does he encourage 
adharmic behavior?
Here is one possible answer: perhaps Krsna is a “threshold” deontologist (cf. Alexander 
and Moore, 2007). That is, perhaps he is a deontologist who believes that, in extreme cases, 
the need to avoid bad consequences can override duties. Suppose that Krsna is a threshold 
deontologist. Further, suppose that horrible consequences will ensue if the Pandavas lose 
the war. In that case, Krsna can violate dharma in order to help the Pandavas win the war.
Here is another possible answer: perhaps Krsna values dharmic behavior merely as a means 
to good consequences. According to the Mahabharata, the rules of dharma are designed 
to produce good consequences: “Dharma is created for the wellbeing of all creation. All 
that is free from harm to any created being is certainly Dharma” (Mahabharata, Kama 
Parvan 69.51, quoted by Khan, 1965, p. 35). Thus, dharmic behavior tends to produce 
good consequences. In that case, perhaps Krsna has come to earth to restore dharmic 
behavior, but only because dharmic behavior is a means to good consequences. If so, then 
nothing prevents Krsna from acting adharmically whenever doing so will produce good 
consequences.
Both of these proposals have something to be said for them. In fact, perhaps both of 
these proposals are true of Krsna at different times. I cannot rule out this possibility. 
The Mahabharata is an epic, not a modern philosophical treatise, and Krsna’s moral 
viewpoint may not be completely consistent throughout. However, I believe that the text 
of the Mahabharata suggests another possibility. This possibility makes Krsna a consistent 




5. Dharmic behavior as an intrinsic good
According to a widespread Hindu tradition, dharma is one of the purusarthas, or goals of 
man (Krishan, 1992, p. 53). The other purusarthas are kama, sensual pleasure, and artha, 
worldly prosperity. Here dharma means not the set of rules called dharma but, rather, 
adherence to those rules: “As an aim in life, rather than as a rule of conduct, dharma refers 
to ‘being established in dharma’” (Koller, 1972, p. 131). Thus, according to this tradition, 
dharmic behavior is one of life’s goals. This tradition appears in the Mahabharata. 
Moreover, the Mahabharata repeatedly says that dharma is more valuable than kama and 
artha (Krishan, 1992, p. 62). Thus, at least within the epic, dharmic behavior seems to be 
the most valuable of earthly goals.
This implies that dharmic behavior is an intrinsic good. If dharmic behavior were good 
only as a means to other goods, then it would not be one of life’s goals; rather, it would 
be only a means to those goals. But in the Mahabharata, dharmic behavior is one of life’s 
goals. Thus, dharmic behavior is not a purely instrumental good. Is dharmic behavior 
some other kind of purely extrinsic good? That is, does dharmic behavior have value only 
in relation to other things? This strikes me as unlikely, given the Mahabharata’s claim that 
dharmic behavior is the most valuable of earthly goals. At any rate, for want of a more 
plausible proposal, I conclude that dharmic behavior is an intrinsic good.
The Mahabharata’s characters also seem to view dharmic behavior as an intrinsic 
good. In many cases, they go out of their way to adhere to the letter of dharma. In one 
passage, the Pandavas trick Drona, a warrior for the Kauravas, into thinking that his son 
Asvatthaman is dead. At Krsna’s suggestion, they kill an elephant named Asvatthaman 
and then tell Drona, “Aswatthaman hath been slain” (Ganguli, 1883-1896a). As a result, 
Drona withdraws from the war to grieve. Now, whether or not the Pandavas had killed 
the elephant, the outcome would have been the same: Drona would have been tricked into 
thinking that Asvatthaman was dead. However, truthfulness is a supreme norm in Hindu 
thought (Buitenen, 1975, p. 177; Goldman, 1997, p. 189; Khan, 1965, p. 204). By killing 
the elephant, the Pandavas ensure that they are technically speaking the truth when they 
say, “Aswatthaman hath been slain.”
Why do Krsna and the Pandavas go out of their way to qualify as “truthful” here? After 
all, their “truthfulness” has no obvious good consequence. A rule-consequentialist might 
argue as follows: “A rule that requires truthfulness at all times will tend to produce good 
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consequences. Thus, one should adhere to that rule, even when it is does not appear to have 
good consequences.” Thus, perhaps Krsna and the Pandavas are rule-consequentialists: 
perhaps they are always truthful, but only as a means to producing good consequences.8 If 
so, then they view truthfulness as a purely instrumental good. However, I find it implausible 
that Krsna and the Pandavas view truthfulness as a purely instrumental good. As we have 
seen, the Mahabharata appears to describe dharmic behavior as an intrinsic good. Thus, 
it seems more likely to me that Krsna and the Pandavas regard the dharmic behavior of 
truthfulness as an intrinsic good. If they do, then it makes sense for them to go out of their 
way to qualify as truthful, even when truthfulness has no obvious good consequence apart 
from truthfulness itself.
Let us consider another example. Arjuna vows to kill anyone who slights his bow. 
Yudhisthira slights Arjuna’s bow. Naturally, Arjuna does not want to kill his brother. So 
instead of killing Yudhisthira, Arjuna insults him, because insulting one’s older brother is 
disrespectful enough to be “like” killing him (Goldman, 1997, p. 190). Because insulting 
Yudhisthira is in some sense equivalent to killing him, Arjuna is not technically breaking 
his vow. Why does Arjuna go to such lengths to avoid breaking his vow? Granted, Arjuna 
refrains from killing Yudhisthira in pursuit of a good consequence, the preservation of 
Yudhisthira’s life. But Arjuna could have achieved that consequence without insulting 
Yudhisthira, by simply refraining from killing him. By insulting Yudhisthira, Arjuna 
suggests that he views the dharmic act of keeping his vow as an intrinsic good.
Again, one could argue that Arjuna is simply being a rule-consequentialist. After all, the 
rule “Always keep your promises” tends to produce good consequences. Perhaps that is 
the only reason why Arjuna goes to such lengths to avoid breaking his vow. If so, then 
Arjuna sees the act of keeping his vow as a purely instrumental good. Again, however, the 
Mahabharata elsewhere seems to describe dharmic behavior as an intrinsic good. Thus, I 
think it is more plausible to say that Arjuna keeps his vow because he regards the dharmic 
act of promise-keeping as an intrinsic good.
One might object that dharmic behavior cannot be an intrinsic good in the Mahabharata. 
As we have seen, dharma exists to promote wellbeing: “Dharma is created for the wellbeing 
of all creation. All that is free from harm to any created being is certainly Dharma” 
8  I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility to me.
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(Mahabharata, Kama Parvan 69.51, quoted by Khan, 1965, p. 35).9 In that case, isn’t 
dharmic behavior good only as a means to wellbeing? And if it is good only as a means 
to wellbeing, then isn’t it only an extrinsic good, not an intrinsic good? There is a simple 
answer to this objection. As we have seen, something can be both an extrinsic good and 
an intrinsic good. Thus, dharmic behavior can be both an extrinsic good—specifically, a 
means to wellbeing—and an intrinsic good.
6. Krsna and dharma-consequentialism
Now we can take another stab at understanding Krsna’s moral viewpoint. As we have seen, 
the Mahabharata’s characters seem to regard dharmic behavior as intrinsically good. If 
dharmic behavior is intrinsically good, then it is something that a consequentialist would 
want to maximize. In that case, a consequentialist might violate dharma if doing so would 
maximize the dharmic behavior of others. After all, a consequentialist might sacrifice 
his own welfare to maximize others’ welfare. In fact, the upright character Bhisma does 
precisely that, renouncing sexual activity so that his father can marry a fisher-girl. (For 
the context of Bhisma’s decision, see Buitenen, 1973, p. 226, and the surrounding passage.) 
Likewise, if a consequentialist believes that dharmic behavior is intrinsically good, then he 
might sacrifice his own dharmic behavior in order to maximize the dharmic behavior of 
others. Thus, I propose that Krsna is a “dharma-consequentialist”, a consequentialist who 
sees dharmic behavior as intrinsically good.
Interpreting Krsna as a dharma-consequentialist seems to give us everything we want. If the 
Pandavas lose the war, then adharma will triumph in the world. Thus, as a consequentialist 
who sees dharmic behavior as intrinsically good, Krsna helps the Pandavas to win the war, 
even by means of adharmic behavior. Krsna violates dharma for the sake of dharma itself. 
Thus, his adharmic actions do not conflict with the Mahabharata’s claim that dharma is 
supremely valuable. Nor do they conflict with his claim that his primary goal is to restore 
dharmic behavior.
An act-consequentialist may feel inclined to object at this point. If Krsna and the Pandavas 
are violating dharma for the sake of intrinsic goods, then are they really violating dharma? 
9  Does this passage force us to infer that the dharmic action is whatever action will maximize wellbeing? I 
do not think so. The passage’s literal meaning does not support such an inference. Taken literally, the passage 
simply says (1) that the rules of dharma are designed to promote wellbeing (hence, we can infer that dharmic 
behavior tends to promote wellbeing) and (2) that if an action harms absolutely no one at all, then we can 




Perhaps Krsna and the Pandavas never actually violate dharma. Perhaps dharma ultimately 
commands that an agent do whatever will maximize intrinsic goods. In other words, 
perhaps the dharmic action is whatever action will maximize intrinsic goods. If so, Krsna 
and the Pandavas do not violate dharma during the war.
I do not think that this suggestion works. Recall that, at the end of the war, voices from 
heaven condemn the Pandavas’ actions (Goldman, 1997, p. 210). Thus, the Pandavas’ 
actions are apparently adharmic.10 Yet those actions contribute to winning the war and, 
thus, to maximizing intrinsic goods. Thus, an action is not dharmic simply in virtue of 
maximizing intrinsic goods. By winning the war by any means necessary, Krsna and the 
Pandavas do the right thing from a consequentialist perspective, but they are not thereby 
doing the dharmic thing.
To understand this point more fully, we must distinguish between Dharma and dharmas.11 
By dharmas, I mean particular duties for particular contexts. The Mahabharata refers to 
many such dharmas. For example, there is a specific dharma for warriors, “the Law of 
the baronage” (Buitenen, 1975, p. 586), which includes fighting (Zaehner, 1969, p. 50), 
and a specific dharma for brahmins (priests), which includes prayer (Buitenen, 1975, 
p. 586). However, Indian tradition often mentions a single universal Dharma, which 
deteriorates with the passing of great periods of cosmic time called yugas (Creel, 1972, p. 
160). According to the Mahabharata, this Dharma declines by one quarter with each yuga 
(Buitenen, 1975, pp. 505, 593-594).
What is the relationship between dharmas and Dharma? The concept of dharma as a 
cosmic principle seems to have evolved from the early Indian concept of rta (Creel, 1972, 
p. 157; Khan, 1965, p. 30-34). Rta is the cosmic order (Khan, 1965, p. 24). But it has a 
moral aspect, for people can deviate from the cosmic order: the wicked man does not 
follow the path of rta (Khan, 1965, p. 27). Likewise, in the Mahabharata, dharma seems 
10  There is some ambiguity here, since Krsna’s divine authority may trump that of the celestial voices. 
In the Mahabharata, Visnu (of whom Krsna is an incarnation) is one of the supreme gods (the other is 
arguably Siva). Nonetheless, when the voices declare that the Pandavas had acted adharmically, Krsna does 
not respond by challenging the voices’ understanding of dharma. Instead, he simply points out that the 
Pandavas could not have won by fighting fairly. Thus, it appears that the Pandavas did in fact violate dharma.
11  I take this distinction from a lecture delivered by Professor Robert Goldman (South Asian Studies C142, 




to be a principle not only of morality but also of cosmic order. As dharma declines, the 
natural world deteriorates: “The cows will yield little milk, and the trees, teeming with 
crows, will yield few flowers and fruits” (Buitenen, 1975, p. 587). Thus, it appears that 
Dharma is a principle of cosmic order, and that the dharmas are the different rules that 
different people must follow in order to be in harmony with Dharma. As one scholar puts 
it, “all ordinary human [little-d] dharma is only an aspect of the universal [big-D] dharma, 
and is justified not in itself, but only in the function of the universal dharma” (Koller, 
1972, p. 141). As another scholar puts it, to violate one’s own dharma is “to be out of step 
with the universe” (Creel, 1972, p. 157).
Now we can explain exactly why Krsna authorizes the Pandavas’ adharmic actions. When 
Krsna comes to earth, the universe is out of order: demons have incarnated themselves 
as the Kauravas (Buitenen, 1973, p. 137). To restore the cosmic order—Dharma—
the Pandavas must win the war, exterminating the demonic incarnations. Thus, Krsna 
encourages the Pandavas to violate dharmas when doing so will help them to win the war. 
By violating dharmas, the Pandavas deviate from the cosmic order themselves, but they 
help to preserve order in the universe at large.
To grasp this point more clearly, we can use the metaphor of a dance routine. The cosmic 
order is a huge, coordinated dance routine with many different assigned roles. Demons 
have started to run amok on the dance floor, interfering with the dance. To save the dance 
routine from being completely ruined, the Pandavas must stop the demons. But to stop 
the demons, they must perform actions (e.g. running after the demons) that deviate from 
their choreography within the dance routine. From a consequentialist perspective, that 
is exactly the right thing to do: if the cosmic order is intrinsically good, then one should 
sacrifice one’s own participation in the cosmic order in order to save the cosmic order.
7. Rule-consequentialism in the Gita
However, we should not forget the starting-point of our discussion—the Bhagavad-Gita. 
In the Gita, Arjuna fears that his fighting will have a negative effect on dharma. If he fights, 
then the war will proceed as planned. If the war proceeds, then the elders of his family 
will die. Without the elders, there will be no one to maintain the family’s norms, and its 
women will mix with men of lower castes. Caste-mixing, in turn, will lead to widespread 
adharmic behavior (Zaehner, 1969, p. 47). In the situation in which Arjuna finds himself, 
“the injunctions of svadharma [i.e. individual dharma], therefore, appear […] to be self-
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destructive in character” (Santina, 1992, p. 107). Arjuna’s individual dharma demands 
that Arjuna participate in the war; however, from Arjuna’s standpoint, it appears that the 
war’s ultimate effect will be to decrease dharmic behavior.  
Of course, Arjuna is wrong about this. The battle between the Pandavas and the Kauravas 
is not a battle between two merely human foes. Instead, it is a battle between incarnate 
gods and demons. Arjuna’s concerns would be valid if his enemies were mere humans. 
However, as incarnate demons, the Kauravas must be defeated at all costs. Arjuna is 
certainly correct in thinking that the war will weaken the social order. However, if the 
Kauravas are not exterminated, then the social and cosmic order may be utterly destroyed. 
With his God’s-eye view, Krsna does not encounter any moral crisis (Dubey, 1992, p. 39); 
he knows what is necessary to maintain dharma. He knows that, contrary to what Arjuna 
thinks, Arjuna’s fighting will actually help to preserve dharma.
However, this is not quite the argument that Krsna presents to Arjuna. In the Gita, Krsna’s 
main argument is not that Arjuna’s fighting will help to restore the cosmic order. Instead, 
Krsna tells Arjuna that he must do the work prescribed by his dharma (Zaehner, 1969, pp. 
50, 137) without anxiety over the consequences (Zaehner, 1969, p. 51). This advice sounds 
deontological. Thus, we face a problem: If Krsna is a consequentialist, as we have argued, 
then why does he present Arjuna with a deontological-sounding argument? 
We can mitigate this problem to an extent by noting that Krsna mentions consequentialist 
considerations in the Gita. He points out that some of the bad consequences that Arjuna 
fears—namely, the deaths of his relatives—are outweighed by the intrinsic goodness of 
dharmic behavior. Krsna reveals that Arjuna is not really killing his relatives when he kills 
their bodies, for their souls are immortal (Zaehner, 1969, p. 49). Agrawal argues that this 
revelation makes the deaths of Arjuna’s relatives irrelevant to Arjuna’s decision:
Realizing not only intellectually but deeply, existentially, that the inner self is 
immortal, Arjuna now feels no grief at the thought of the death of his affectionate 
and respected ones. […] The result of this new orientation of mind is that 
certain considerations drop out as irrelevant in determining how to act. Thus, for 
example, the fact that Arjuna’s dear ones will die in the war becomes irrelevant to 
the question of fighting a righteous war. (1992, p. 140-141) 
I would not go so far. The soul’s immortality does not change the fact that murder is 
usually wrong. For example, the Mahabharata affirms that the murder of brahmins 
(priests) is extremely sinful (Buitenen, 1973, p. 134). And, presumably, murder is wrong at 
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least partly because the preservation of bodily life is good and the loss of bodily life is bad. 
Thus, the soul’s immortality does not mean that the death of Arjuna’s relatives is morally 
irrelevant. It simply means that the intrinsic goodness of his relatives’ bodily life is not 
great enough to outweigh the intrinsic goodness of dharmic behavior. Thus, by adhering 
to his warrior dharma, Arjuna produces more intrinsic good than he would produce by 
not fighting. Therefore, when Krsna tells Arjuna to fulfill his warrior dharma without 
worrying about the deaths that it will cause, he is in fact making a largely consequentialist 
argument, contrary to appearances.  
The problem is also mitigated once we realize that the Gita is not just a set of advice 
for Arjuna. The Gita discusses many subjects in minute detail—subjects only tangentially 
related to Arjuna’s dilemma. For example, it discusses the Day and Night of Brahma 
the creator12 (Zaehner, 1969, p. 73), the different afterlives awaiting different kinds of 
worshippers (Zaehner, 1969, p. 76), the greater difficulty of contemplating an impersonal 
God as opposed to a personal God (Zaehner, 1969, p. 88), and the theory of the three 
constituents of reality, “goodness” (sattva), “passion” (rajas), and “darkness” (tamas)13 
(Zaehner, 1969, p. 352). The Gita does not simply present moral advice; it presents a 
cosmology. If the Gita’s author intended the Gita merely as part of the story of the Bharata 
war, then this degree of complexity would be odd. After all, Krsna’s long-winded sermon 
hardly helps to move the plot forward, except insofar as it motivates Arjuna to fight. Thus, 
the Gita’s author probably intends the Gita largely as a message to ordinary people reading 
the Mahabharata. 
Once we realize that the Gita is intended primarily as a message to ordinary people, we can 
interpret Krsna as consequentialist even in the Gita. As we have seen, the Pandavas often 
violate dharma during the war. However, in those cases, they have Krsna—God incarnate—
nearby to assure them that their adharmic actions will produce good consequences. 
Ordinary people do not have God at their side to tell them when it is permissible to violate 
12  Brahma is the creator of the universe, although most contemporary forms of Hinduism do not identify 
him with the supreme being (Visnu and another god named Siva often receive that honor). The Day of 
Brahma and the Night of Brahma are vast periods of cosmic time. The universe is destroyed and recreated 
repeatedly during the Day of Brahma. At the beginning of the Night of Brahma, the universe dissolves com-
pletely, to remain “unmanifest” until the next Day. The Day and Night follow each other in an endless cycle 
(cf. Zaehner, 1969, p. 73).
13  Here I follow Zaehner’s translations of the terms sattva, rajas, and tamas (cf. Zaehner, 1969, pp. 16, 140). 




dharma. Hence, ordinary people would be most likely to produce good consequences 
if they simply had a policy of adhering to dharma. As we have seen, the Gita’s author 
intends the Gita primarily as advice for ordinary people. Thus, he has Krsna preach a 
policy of unwavering adherence to dharma. In preaching this policy, Krsna is being a good 
consequentialist: by convincing ordinary people to always follow dharma, he is indirectly 
producing good consequences.
8. Rule-consequentialism and dharma-consequentialism 
Before concluding this paper, I must address a final issue. One might think that Krsna’s 
dharma-consequentialism is simply a form of rule-consequentialism. After all, an 
individual’s dharma consists of a set of rules. So can’t we simply replace the word dharma 
with “rule” and conclude that Krsna is a rule-consequentialist? In response to this question, 
I will make two points.
First of all, the term “dharma-consequentialism” is not simply a synonym for “rule-
consequentialism”, a synonym that substitutes the word dharma for the word “rules”. A rule-
consequentialist selects rules based on the rules’ tendency to maximize intrinsic goods. 
He then says that actions must obey those rules. In other words, rule-consequentialism 
is called rule-consequentialism because it says that right actions adhere to certain rules. 
In contrast, Krsna’s moral system is called dharma-consequentialism because it says that 
right actions aim at maximizing global adherence to the rules of dharma; this is very 
different from saying that right actions themselves adhere to the rules. When Krsna breaks 
the rules of dharma in order to win the war, he adheres to dharma-consequentialism, but 
he obviously does not adhere to rule-consequentialism.
Secondly, however, I agree that Krsna’s dharma-consequentialism sometimes takes the 
form of rule-consequentialism. In the Gita, Krsna advocates strict adherence to dharma 
without anxiety over consequences. As I have argued, that is because the rules of dharma 
tend to produce good consequences. So, in the Gita, Krsna does advocate a form of rule-
consequentialism.
9. Conclusion
The Krsna of the Mahabharata holds a complex moral outlook. He urges the Pandavas to 
violate dharma, to deviate from the cosmic order. But for Krsna, conformity to the cosmic 
order, conformity to dharma, is intrinsically good. He urges the Pandavas to violate 
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dharma only because their adharmic actions will help to restore dharmic behavior in the 
universe at large. In short, Krsna is a consequentialist, but he holds a peculiar form of 
consequentialism in which dharmic behavior itself is intrinsically good.
This dharma-consequentialism probably will not find many adherents in the philosophy 
departments of Western universities. The majority of Western philosophers are neither 
Hindus nor Indians. Hence, the majority of Western philosophers do not believe in the 
principle of cosmic order called dharma.14 Thus, although many Western philosophers 
are consequentialists, the content of their consequentialism differs from the content of 
dharma-consequentialism. Nonetheless, the dharma-consequentialism found in the 
Mahabharata is a coherent moral theory and represents an alternative to the kinds of 
consequentialism known in the West.
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